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stand point by modelling this problem as a cost sharing game that turns out to be a ‘reverse’ airport game whose core is … shown to have a regular structure. This enables an easy calculation of the nucleolus that happens to define the upper bound …
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This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of the Owen set of transportation games. In the characterization we use six properties including consistency (CONS2) and splitting and merging (SM) which are firstly proposed and defined for this setup in the present paper. Copyright Kluwer...
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Three values for non-transferable utility games -- the Harsanyi NTU-value, the Shapley NTU-value, and the Maschler--Owen consistent NTU-value -- are compared in a simple example. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
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By focusing on players’ relative contributions, we study some properties for values in positive cooperative games with transferable utilities. The well-known properties of symmetry (also known as “equal treatment of equals”) and marginality are based on players’ marginal contributions to...
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stable core as a solution concept that contains those payoffs that are both stable in an economic sense, i.e., belong to the … core of the underlying cooperative game, and stable in a social sense, i.e., payoffs are sustained by a collection of … core is a subset and therefore a refinement of the core. We show by means of examples that in many cases the socially …
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