<Para ID="Par1">This paper identifies, and tests experimentally, a prediction of the Nash bargaining axioms that may appear counterintuitive. The context is a simple bargaining problem in which two players have to agree a choice from three alternatives. One alternative favours one player and a second favours...</para>

Various experimental procedures aimed at measuring individual risk aversion involve a list of pairs of alternative prospects. We first study the widely used method by Holt and Laury (Am Econ Rev 92(5):1644–1655, <CitationRef CitationID="CR21">2002</CitationRef>), for which we find that the removal of some items from the lists yields a...</citationref>

Since the seminal paper of Nash (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 36:48–49, <CitationRef CitationID="CR12">1950</CitationRef>) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. In a recent paper of Pruzhansky (Int J Game Theory 40:351–365, <CitationRef CitationID="CR17">2011</CitationRef>) it was shown that under fairy general conditions...</citationref></citationref>

We revisit the sequential search problem by Hey (J Econ Behav Organ 8:137–144, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">1987</CitationRef>). In a 2 <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\times $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mo>×</mo> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> 2 factorial design, varying fixed and random cost treatments with and without recall, we address open research questions that were originally stated by Hey (<CitationRef CitationID="CR16">1987</CitationRef>). Our results...</citationref></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></citationref>

<Para ID="Par1">This is an account of my work on experimental economics over the years. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014