We take a decentralized approach to regulating environmental pollution in settings where each agent's pollution possibly affects all others. There is no central agency to enforce pollution abatement or coordinate monetary transfers. Moreover, agents possess private information, which precludes...

We propose the river pollution claims problem to distribute a limited pollution budget among agents located along a river. A key distinction with the standard claims problem is that agents are ordered and they are given priority based on their location in this order instead of their identity. We...

We propose the river pollution claims problem to distribute a pollution budget among agents located along a river. A key distinction with the standard claims problem is that agents are ordered exogenously. For environmental reasons, the location of pollution along the river is an important...

We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite...