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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - 2014
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491315
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Characterizing the Core Via K-Core Covers
Sanchez-Rodriguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ⌊|N |/2⌋-core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038137
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Characterizations of Network Power Measures
van den Brink, René; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud; … - 2005
A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325263
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Characterizing the Core via k-Core Covers
Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ? …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326133
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Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
van den Brink, René; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2004
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A one-point solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss a class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325319
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Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values
van den Brink, René; Funaki, Yukihiko; Ju, Yuan - 2007
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325573
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Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values
van den Brink, Rene; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2010
We generalize the null player property (satisfied by the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (satisfied by the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property, stating that a delta-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326064
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Consistency, Population Solidarity, and Egalitarian Solutions for TU-Games
van den Brink, Rene; Chun, Youngsub; Funaki, Yukihiko; … - 2012
A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions, one consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326277
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Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values
van den Brink, René; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2010
We generalize the null player property (satisfied by the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (satisfied by the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property, stating that a delta-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045005
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On weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative games
Zou, Zhengxing; van den Brink, René; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2024
We propose and characterize weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative transferable utility games. Each weighted-egalitarian value divides the worth of the grand coalition into two parts and allocates them through equality and proportionality based on exogenous player weights. We characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014547733