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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - 2014
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491315
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Characterizing the Core Via K-Core Covers
Sanchez-Rodriguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ⌊|N |/2⌋-core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038137
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Characterizations of Network Power Measures
van den Brink, René; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud; … - 2005
A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325263
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Characterizing the Core via k-Core Covers
Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ? …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326133
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A Value for Directed Communication Situations
González-Arangüena, Enrique; Manuel, Conrado; Gomez, … - 2008
In this paper we introduce an extension of the model of restricted communication in cooperative games as introduced in Myerson (1977) by allowing communication links to be directed and the worth of a coalition to depend on the order in which the players enter the coalition. Therefore, we model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325743
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Players Indifferent to Cooperate and Characterizations of the Shapley Value
Manuel, Conrado; Gonzalez-Aranguena, Enrique - 2012
In this paper we provide new axiomatizations of the Shapley value for TU-games using axioms that are based on relational aspects in the interactions among players. Some of these relational aspects, in particular the economic or social interest of each player in cooperating with each other, can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326379
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Order Monotonic Solutions for Generalized Characteristic Functions
van den Brink, René; González-Aranguena, Enrique; … - 2013
Generalized characteristic functions extend characteristic functions of 'classical' TU-games by assigning a real number to every ordered coalition being a permutation of any subset of the player set. Such generalized characteristic functions can be applied when the earnings or costs of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326540
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A Value for Directed Communication Situations
Gonzalez-Aranguena, Enrique; Manuel, Conrado; Gomez, Daniel - 2008
In this paper we introduce an extension of the model of restricted communication in cooperative games as introduced in Myerson (1977) by allowing communication links to be directed and the worth of a coalition to depend on the order in which the players enter the coalition. Therefore, we model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047887
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Players Indifferent to Cooperate and Characterizations of the Shapley Value
Manuel, Conrado; Gonzalez-Aranguena, Enrique; van den … - 2012
In this paper we provide new axiomatizations of the Shapley value for TU-games using axioms that are based on relational aspects in the interactions among players. Some of these relational aspects, in particular the economic or social interest of each player in cooperating with each other, can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041073
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Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; … - 2014
merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377244