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On Axiomatizations of the Shapley Value for Assignment Games
van den Brink, René; Pintér, Miklós - 2012
We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040150
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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - 2014
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491315
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An Algorithm for Computing the Nucleolus of Disjunctive Additive Games with an Acyclic Permission Structure
van den Brink, René; Katsev, Ilya V.; van der Laan, Gerard - 2009
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047081
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Characterizing the Core Via K-Core Covers
Sanchez-Rodriguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ⌊|N |/2⌋-core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038137
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Computation of the Nucleolus for a Class of Disjunctive Games with a Permission Structure
van den Brink, René; Katsev, Ilya; van der Laan, Gerard - 2008
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325689
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An Algorithm for Computing the Nucleolus of Disjunctive Additive Games with An Acyclic Permission Structure
van den Brink, René; Katsev, Ilya; van der Laan, Gerard - 2008
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325798
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Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure
van den Brink, René - 2011
In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game. The graph-partition restricted TU-game is obtained by taking the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118315
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Games on Union Closed Systems
van den Brink, René; Katsev, Ilya V.; van der Laan, Gerard - 2011
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044020
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Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
van den Brink, René; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2010
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In ca! se …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014191059
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Valuation Monotonicity, Fairness and Stability in Assignment Problems
van den Brink, René; Núñez, Marina; Robles, Francisco - 2018
In this paper, we investigate the possibility of having stable rules for two-sided markets with transferable utility, that satisfy some valuation monotonicity and fairness axioms. Valuation fairness requires that changing the valuation of a buyer for the object of a seller leads to equal changes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932342