We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction...

This paper discusses a number of issues that will become increasingly important nowthat the concept of marginal external cost pricing becomes more likely to be implementedas a policy strategy in transport in reality. The first part of the paper deals with thelong-run efficiency of marginal...

On an increasing scale auctions are used to allocate the licenses tooperate on markets which are thought notsuited for free entry. According to standard economic arguments, thelicense fees paid at the auction will notaffect consumer prices since they constitute a sunk cost. Thisstandard view is...

This paper studies the second-best problem where not all links of acongested transportation network can be tolled. The second-best taxrule for this problem is derived for general static networks, so thatthe solution presented is valid for any graph of the network, and forany set of tolling...

A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case....

For several decades growth of traffic volumes has outstrippedinvestments inroad infrastructure. The result has been a relentless increase intrafficcongestion. This paper reviews the economic principles behindcongestionpricing in static and dynamic settings, which derive from thebenefits...