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Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert - 2021
brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into managerial and non-managerial positions … return to managerial ability is always highest in the private sector. As a result, relatively many of the more able managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316467
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Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert - 2008
brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into managerial and non-managerial positions … return to managerial ability is always highest in the private sector. As a result, relatively many of the more able managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325712
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Testing for Distortions in Performance Measures : An Application to Residual Income Based Measures Like EVA
Sloof, Randolph; van Praag, Mirjam - 2014
Distorted performance measures in compensation contracts elicit suboptimal behavioral responses that may even prove to be dysfunctional (gaming). This paper applies the empirical test developed by Courty and Marschke (2008) to detect whether the widely used class of Residual Income based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014140893
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The Executive Turnover Risk Premium
Peters, Florian S.; Wagner, Alexander F. - 2012
We establish that CEOs of companies experiencing volatile industry conditions are more likely tobe dismissed. At the same time, industry risk is, controlling for various other factors, unlikelyto be directly associated with CEO compensation other than through dismissal risk. Using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326426
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The value relevance of forced top management departures: Dutch evidence
Cools, Kees; van Praag, Mirjam - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324959
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Gift Exchange in the Workplace
Dur, Robert - 2008
convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways … altruistic managers may offer lower wages and nevertheless build up better social-exchange relationships with their employees … than egoistic managers do. In such equilibria, a low wage signals to employees that the manager has something else to offer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325842
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The Degradation of Distorted Performance Measures
Sloof, Randolph; van Praag, Mirjam - 2008
Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325988
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How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?
Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326054