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the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition … experiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325937
favor and against this assumption and test in our own experiment, whether and which personality factors are useful in … understand what to expect from the inclusion of personality variables in their models and experiments, and where further research …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326411
that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on average, men and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325668
by an experiment. Finally, we show how partial information transmission can lead to communication failure, and show how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325901
strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on average, men …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014193586
After decades of government growth, Western countries have witnessed major policy reversals. Prominent examples include the far-reaching policy reversals implemented by Thatcher, Reagan, and Douglas. This paper offers an explanation for these policy reversals. Our key argument rests on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324722
influencingeconomic growth performance as opposed to an experiment in direct signalling . …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324765
Collective decision procedures should balance the incentives they provide toacquire information and their capacity to aggregate private information. In a decisionproblem in which a project can be accepted or rejected once information about its qualityhas been acquired or not, we compare the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324768
Can vanity do any good? It may seem obvious to answer this question in the negative, as economists have shown how reputational concerns lead agents e.g. to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how proud agents may be a social blessing. An agent may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324778
This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature ascomposed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. Thefloor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented.The policy outcome is ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324782