We study the optimal choice of quasi-likelihoods for nearly integrated,possibly non-normal, autoregressive models. It turns out that the two mostnatural candidate criteria, minimum Mean Squared Error (MSE) and maximumpower against the unit root null, give rise to different...

After decades of government growth, Western countries have witnessed major policy reversals. Prominent examples include the far-reaching policy reversals implemented by Thatcher, Reagan, and Douglas. This paper offers an explanation for these policy reversals. Our key argument rests on the...

Portfolio risk is in an important way driven by 'abnormal' returns emanating from heavy tailed distributed asset returns. The theory of regular variation and extreme values provides a model for this feature of financial data. We first review this theory and subsequently study the problem of...

Collective decision procedures should balance the incentives they provide toacquire information and their capacity to aggregate private information. In a decisionproblem in which a project can be accepted or rejected once information about its qualityhas been acquired or not, we compare the...

Empirical studies showed that many types of network traffic exhibit long-range dependence (LRD),i.e., burstiness on a wide variety of time-scales. Given that traffic streams are indeed endowed withLRD properties, a next question is: what is their impact on network performance? To assess...

Can vanity do any good? It may seem obvious to answer this question in the negative, as economists have shown how reputational concerns lead agents e.g. to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how proud agents may be a social blessing. An agent may...

This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature ascomposed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. Thefloor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented.The policy outcome is ex...

We provide an explanation why centralisation of political decision makingresults in overspending in some policy domains, whereas too low spending persists in others.We study a model in which delegates from jurisdictions bargain over local public goods provision.If all of the costs of public...