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Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure
van den Brink, René - 2011
this game the dividend of any coalition that is neither a subset of a union nor a union of unions is zero. The partition … dividend of any coalition that is not connected in the graph is zero. We apply the values to an economic example in which the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118315
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Share Functions for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation
Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; van den Brink, Rene; van der … - 2012
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of … the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure. In such … value for games with coalition structure under the assumption that also the unions can cooperate among them. Winter extended …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326205
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Terrorist Targeting, Information, and Secret Coalitions
Koster, Maurice; Lindner, Ines; McCormick, Gordon C.; … - 2010
We consider a game played by a state sponsor of terrorism, a terrorist group, and the target of terrorist attacks. The sponsoring state wishes to see as much damage inflicted on the target of attack as possible, but wishes to avoid retaliation. To do so, his relationship with the terrorist group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045844
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A Class of Consistent Share Functions for Games in Coalition Structure
van den Brink, René; van der Laan, Gerard - 2001
players in the game.In this paper we consider cooperative games in which the playersare organized into an a priori coalition … payoff is equal to its share in someinternal game within its coalition multiplied by the share of thiscoalition in an … properties. Weprovide axiomatizations of this class of coalition structure sharefunctions using these consistency and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325005
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An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value for Cooperative Games on Antimatroids
Algaba, E.; Bilbao, J.M.; van den Brink, R.; … - 2002
Cooperative games on antimatroids are cooperative games restricted by a combinatorial structure which generalize the permission structure. So, cooperative games on antimatroids group several well-known families of games which have important applications in economics and politics. Therefore, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324827
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On Hierarchies and Communication
van den Brink, René - 2006
Many economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but also belong to some relational structure in which they usually take different positions. Two examples...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325156
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Positional Wages, Market Wages and Firm Size
van den Brink, Rene; Ruys, Pieter H.M. - 2005
We model a firm in an institutional market setting, consisting of a production technology and its governance. The governance consists of a hierarchical firm structure, a cost efficiency parameter,and an internal pay system. The depth of the firm is determined by profit maximization under the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325411
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The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf - 2008
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is proposed for this class of games. Given the graph structure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325870
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On the Core of Cost-Revenue Games: Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games with Revenues
Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza; Reijnierse, Hans - 2012
-revenue game. By considering cooperation among the agents using the general service, the value of a coalition is defined as the … maximum net profit that the coalition may obtain by means of cooperation. As a result, a coalition may profit from not …-revenue games. Under the assumption that cooperation among the members of the grand coalition grants the use of the service under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326323
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Share Functions for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation
Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel - 2012
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of … the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure. In such … value for games with coalition structure under the assumption that also the unions can cooperate among them. Winter extended …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013106700