Showing 1 - 10 of 113
to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe … information is present, suggesting that firms have greater incentives to form cartels in that situation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288400
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite-horizon Markov-perfect duopoly dynamics with ongoing demand uncertainty. All entrants serving the model industry incur sunk costs, and exit avoids future fixed costs. We focus on the unique...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325491
This paper describes a classroom experiment that illustrates the research and development investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages in which student sellers first make investment decisions then production decisions. The classroom...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325506
We examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. For that we utilize a dynamic model of R&D whereby we consider all possible initial marginal cost levels (technologies), including those...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326462
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (The American Economic Review 78(5): 1133–1137, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011662518
A start-up engages in an investment portfolio problem by choosing how much to invest in a "rival" project, which threatens the position of an existing incumbent, and a "non-rival" project. Anticipating its acquisition by the incumbent, the start-up strategically distorts its portfolio of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012797223
An entrant and an incumbent engage in an investment portfolio problem where each chooses how to allocate its research funds across a rival market, where they compete with one another, and a non-rival market, where they do not interact. Allowing for acquisitions distorts both players' incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014469445
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526125
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 5) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014159864
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin ('American Economic Review', 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126598