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Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011
We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information … maximum amount of information that can be transmitted in equilibrium is increasing in the bargaining power of the Sender … predict that information transmission is increasing in the Sender's relative bargaining power. This prediction is corroborated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325901
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Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325937
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An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011
, Offerman & Onderstal (2011a) about bargaining power and information transmission. We find that, as predicted, less information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326221
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Denial and Alarmism in Collective Action Problems
Förster, Manuel; van der Weele, Joël J. - 2018
information about these returns as well as their own taste for cooperation, or social preferences. Before deciding to contribute … good benefits both agents, there are incentives to misrepresent information. First, others’ willingness to cooperate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819534
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Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2015
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491401
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An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian - 2012
We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2012a). ACDC has been shown to be predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113620
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Power and the Privilege of Clarity : An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, T. J. S.; Onderstal, Sander - 2012
how power shapes clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an … informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Our main result is that the maximum amount of information transmission is … whose preferences are closely aligned with the Receiver can completely reveal their information in equilibrium. We discuss …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184653
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Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games : ACDC Rocks When Other Criteria Remain Silent
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, T. J. S.; Onderstal, Sander - 2012
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a behavioral refinement and stability measure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014185948
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Consumers Networks and Search Equilibria
Galeotti, Andrea - 2004
search for price quotations and the information gathered are non-excludable along direct links. This allows me to explore the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325308
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Diffusion of Behavior in Network Games Orchestrated by Social Learning
Huang, Jia-Ping; Koster, Maurice; Lindner, Ines - 2013
The novelty of our model is to combine models of collective action on networks with models of social learning. Agents are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to adopt a new behavior or technology or stay with the default...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328348