Consider a government that auctions a franchise for, e.g., an airport, telecommunication network, or utility. Consider an 'incumbent bidder' that owns a complement or substitute. With an auction on the transfer (i.e. payment) to the government, the incumbent is advantaged.If the government...

Consider a government tendering a facility, such as an airport or utility, where one bidder owns a competing facility. With a standard auction, this existing operator bids above the auctioned facility's expected profit, as winning means being a monopolist instead of a duopolist. This auction...

This paper investigates regulation by auctions of private supply of congestible infrastructures in two networks settings: 1) two serial facilities, where the consumer has to use both in order to consume; and 2) two parallel facilities that are imperfect substitutes. There are four market...

This paper investigates regulation by auctions of private supply of congestible infrastructures in two networks settings: 1) two serial facilities, where the consumer has to use both in order to consume; and 2) two parallel facilities that are imperfect substitutes. There are four market...

This paper analyzes empirically whether and if so to what extent later entrants in the European mobile telephony industry have a disadvantage vis-à-vis incumbents and early mover entrants. To analyze this question a dynamic model of market share development and a series of static models are...

Most airports operate under public ownership, while some are privatized and economically regulated. Only a few airports are privately owned and experience little or no ex-ante regulation of airport charges. On the other hand, airports nowadays earn as much revenue from transport-related...

'Robot cars' are cars that allow for automated driving. They can drive closer together than human driven 'normal cars', and thereby raise road capacity. Obtaining a robot car instead of a normal car can also be expected to lower the user's value of time losses (VOT), because travel time can be...

Consider a government tendering the right to operate, for example, an airport, telecommunication network, or utility. There is an 'incumbent bidder' who owns a complement or substitute facility, and one entering 'new bidder'. With a 'standard auction' on the payment to the government, the...

We formulate a horizontal differentiation model with price-sensitive demand and asymmetric transport costs, in the context of transport scheduling. Two competitors choose fares and departure times in a fixed time interval. Consumers are distributed uniformly along the interval; their location...