We examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. For that we utilize a dynamic model of R&D whereby we consider all possible initial marginal cost levels (technologies), including those...

We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (The American Economic Review 78(5): 1133–1137, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product...

We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We...

We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 5) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market...

We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin ('American Economic Review', 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We...

This paper distinguishes uncertainty types that differ continuously with respect to the degree to which uncertainty affects the optimal price/price markup or optimal quantity. A monopoly example is used to show that seemingly strong assumptions on functional forms can represent a wide variety of...

We study the trip scheduling preferences of train commuters in a real-life setting. The underlying data have been collected during large-scale peak avoidance experiment conducted in the Netherlands, in which participants could earn monetary rewards for traveling outside peak hours. The...

This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature ascomposed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. Thefloor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented.The policy outcome is ex...

This paper is concerned with a policy oriented macroeconomic experiment involving an 'international' economy with a relatively small 'home' country and a large 'foreign' country. It compares the economic performance of two alternative tax systems as a means to finance unemployment benefits: a...