decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while …We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation … activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or …

In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions …. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non …-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …

Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector … the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience …

mechanism than the customer-initiated auction. When voting between the two auctions, participants tended to favor the server …

The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet …

We study auctions in which the number of potential bidders is large, such as in Internet auctions. With numerous … Internet auctions. …

lottery ticket.li one license is auctioned, auctions select the firm that is least risk averse.This is what we call the risk …

games, and show how it can be used to directly solve for equilibrium behavior in auctions, pricing games, tournaments, R …

Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest … bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two … through a mathematical program. Simulations provide numerical evidence that the symmetric NE with the lowest expected gains is …

There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an … auctioneer. We show that auctions with flexible entry fees have a fully revealing equilibrium where bidders signal their type …