Showing 1 - 10 of 119
Distorted performance measures in compensation contracts elicit suboptimal behavioral responses that may even prove to … whether the widely used class of Residual Income based performance measures — such as Economic Value Added (EVA) — is … economic circumstances and the self-selection of firms using EVA. Our findings indicate that EVA is a distorted performance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014140893
Distorted performance measures in compensation contracts elicit suboptimal behavioral responses that may even prove to … whether the widely used class of Residual Income based performance measures - such as Economic Value Added (EVA) - is … economic circumstances and the self-selection of firms using EVA. Our findings indicate that EVA is a distorted performance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377217
Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts … noise and distortion of a performance measure can be measured. Courty and Marschke (2007) have recently developed an elegant … empirical test to detect distortion, based on the degradation of a performance measure subsequent to increasing its weight in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325988
in Scotland. New measures of flexibility and turbulence are used to explain the performance of mature small firms. These … depend on our unique body of evidence from interviews with owner managers. Performance is measured using a Likert scale over … performance. This is done in two forms. The first involves generalised least squares estimation (with heteroskedastic adjustment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324750
This paper studies wage structure characteristics and their incentive effects within one firm. Based on personnel records and an employee survey, we provide evidence that wages are attached to jobs and that promotions play a dominant role as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325291
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325487
performance. Measured performance equals actual performance plus noise. We compare a stable environment where the noise is small … expectancy theory; noisier performance measures do not lower work motivation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325762
affects the performance of firms that increase the power of the incentive schemes. In a laboratory experiment, we let subjects …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325865
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326344
Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326509