Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 120
Cover Image
Games on Union Closed Systems
van den Brink, Rene; Katsev, Ilya; van der Laan, Gerard - 2011
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325691
Cover Image
The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf - 2008
-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325870
Cover Image
Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2010
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325973
Cover Image
On the Core of Cost-Revenue Games: Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games with Revenues
Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza; Reijnierse, Hans - 2012
allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost … consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a non-empty core for any vector of revenues if, and only … if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326323
Cover Image
Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations
van den Brink, René; Gilles, Robert P. - 2003
In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decisionmakers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325070
Cover Image
Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure
van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2011
In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game. The graph-partition restricted TU-game is obtained by taking the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326357
Cover Image
The Prediction Value
Koster, Maurice; Kurz, Sascha; Lindner, Ines; Napel, Stefan - 2013
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i's prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328331
Cover Image
Sharing the cost of cleaning up a polluted river
Li, Wenzhong; Xu, Genjiu; van den Brink, Rene - 2021
Consider a group of agents located along a polluted river where every agent must pay a certain cost for cleaning up the polluted river. Following the model of Ni and Wang (2007), we propose the class of alpha-Local Responsibility Sharing methods, which generalizes the Local Responsibility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012605994
Cover Image
On Harsanyi Payoff Vectors and the Weber Set
Derks, Jean; van der Laan, Gerard; Vasil'ev, Valeri - 2002
, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324857
Cover Image
Computation of the Nucleolus for a Class of Disjunctive Games with a Permission Structure
van den Brink, René; Katsev, Ilya; van der Laan, Gerard - 2008
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325689