In a laboratory experiment, we compare two auction mechanisms that determine the sequence of service to queued customers. In the server-initiated auction, the server, when idle, sells the right to be served next to the highest bidding customer in the queue and distributes the proceeds among the...

A common assumption in the analysis of symmetric auctions is that the bidders' value estimates exhibit positive informational externalities (PIE). This assumption implies upward drifting price sequences at sequential auctions, which is challenged by an empirical regularity, known as the...

Consider a government tendering a facility, such as an airport or utility, where one bidder owns a competing facility. With a standard auction, this existing operator bids above the auctioned facility's expected profit, as winning means being a monopolist instead of a duopolist. This auction...

This paper assesses the effects of changes in scoring weights in auctions, using a unique sample of biddings of private Welfare-to-Work (WTW) organizations to reintegrate groups of unemployed and disabled workers. WTW-organizations did not only bid on prices, but also received points for three...

Consider a government tendering the right to operate, for example, an airport, telecommunication network, or utility. There is an 'incumbent bidder' who owns a complement or substitute facility, and one entering 'new bidder'. With a 'standard auction' on the payment to the government, the...

In recent years, Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have been used around the world to allocate frequency spectrum for mobile telecom licenses. CCAs are claimed to significantly reduce the scope for gaming or strategic bidding. In this paper, we show, however, that CCAs significantly enhance...

We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that...

Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that biddings rings are more stable in the English...

We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by its candidate. When the contract space...

According to basic models of sequential private value auctions of identical objects, consecutive prices are on average constant or rising. In empirical studies, prices are often found to decline. Several explanations have been put forward for this declining price anomaly. In this paper we...