Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 252
Cover Image
Bargaining in the Presence of Condorcet Cycles: The Role of Asymmetries
Kamm, Aaron; Houba, Harold - 2015
recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the … equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from theory are: a) Subjects under-exploit their bargaining power by being more … asymmetries have on bargaining power, especially when the asymmetries relate to recognition probabilities. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288420
Cover Image
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Keser, Claudia; van Winden, Frans A.A.M. - 2000
We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays arepeated public good game to astrangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations.Subjects in the partners conditioncontribute from the first period on significantly more to the public good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324530
Cover Image
Control without Deception
Bardsley, Nicholas - 2000
deceiving anyone. The design should be suitable formost economics experiments, and works by amodification of an already standard … both internallyand with other public goods experiments. In addition, simultaneousplay is found to be more efficient than …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324715
Cover Image
The Condorcet Paradox Revisited
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Houba, Harold - 2010
We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325975
Cover Image
Firm-Specific Information and Explicit Collusion in Experimental Oligopolies
Gomez-Martin, Francisco; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2015
to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288400
Cover Image
Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment
Offerman, Theo; Verbon, Jan PottersHarry A.A.; Verbon, … - 1999
Recent theoretical work shows that folk theorems can be developed for infiniteoverlapping generations games. Cooperation in such games can be sustained as aNash equilibrium. Besides the efficient cooperative equilibrium there is alsothe inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324617
Cover Image
Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets
Riedl, Arno; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2003
Tax Liability Side Equivalence (tax LSE) claims that the statutory incidence of a tax is irrelevant for its economic incidence. In gift-exchange labor markets, firms provide a gift to workers by paying high wages, and workers reciprocate by providing high efforts. Tax LSE is theoretically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324733
Cover Image
Pivotal Suppliers and Market Power in Experimental Supply Function Competition
Brandts, Jordi; Reynolds, Stanley S.; Schram, Arthur - 2011
(MUA) model. We find that pivotal suppliers do indeed exercise their market power in the experiments. We also find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325805
Cover Image
Individual Expectations and Aggregate Macro Behavior
Assenza, Tiziana; Heemeijer, Peter; Hommes, Cars; … - 2013
, within a standard New Keynesian model, by means of laboratory experiments with human subjects. Three aggregate outcomes are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326142
Cover Image
Output Commitment through Product Bundling: Experimental Evidence
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Mueller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2011
ABSTRACT: We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. One firm has monopoly power in a first market but competes with another firm in a second market. We compare treatments where the multiproduct firm (i) always bundles, (ii) never bundles, and (iii) chooses whether or not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326151