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Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers
Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; de Vries, Casper G. - 2009
-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine spillover effects that … economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where individuals …&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325768
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The Unique-lowest Sealed-bid Auction
Houba, Harold; van der Laan, Dinard; Veldhuizen, Dirk - 2008
Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325775
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Market Power in Water Markets
Ansink, Erik; Houba, Harold - 2014
Water markets with market power are analysed as multi-market Cournot competition in which the river structure constrains access to local markets and limited resources impose capacity constraints. Conditions for uniqueness are identified. Lerner indices are larger under binding resource...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194624
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Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining
Houba, Harold - 2005
The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325478
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Alternating Offers in Economic Environments
Houba, Harold - 2005
The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for positive time between proposals. As time vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325509
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Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model
Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan - 2007
We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set of its subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, we provide a recursive technique that relies on the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payoffs. When players have different time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325535
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Preopening and Equilibrium Selection
Calcagno, Riccardo; Lovo, Stefano - 2010
We introduce a form of pre-play communication that we call preopening. During the preopening, players announce their tentative actions to be played in the underlying game. Announcements are made using a posting system which is subject to stochastic failures. Posted actions are publicly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326012
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Market Power in Water Markets
Ansink, Erik; Houba, Harold - 2010
Water markets with market power are analysed as multi-market Cournot competition in which the river structure constrains access to local markets and limited resources impose capacity constraints. Conditions for uniqueness are identified. Lerner indices are larger under binding resource...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326027
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The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance : A Note on Gender Differences
Vyrastekova, Jana; Onderstal, Sander - 2010
We analyze gender differences in the trust game in a "behind the veil of ignorance" design. This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on average, men and women do not differ in "trust", and that women are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014193586
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Power and the Privilege of Clarity : An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, T. J. S.; Onderstal, Sander - 2012
People in inferior bargaining positions are often vaguer when they express their preferences. In this paper, we explain how power shapes clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Our main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184653