It is argued that the concept of well-being inequality cannot be properly defined without taking the reference process into account. The reference effect depends on how frequently individuals compare with others and on the degree of social transparency in society. In this paper we employ the...

We estimate responsibility-sensitive welfare weights for health that facilitate inequalityand inequity-sensitive policy evaluation. In a UK general population sample, 569 online experiment participants distribute constrained resources to determine the health of hypothetical individuals...

We design a novel experiment to identify aversion to pure (univariate) health inequality separately from aversion to income-related and income-caused health inequality. Participants allocate resources to determine health of individuals. Identification comes from random variation in resource...

In this paper it is argued that subjective well-being of the individual depends on two types of variables. The first type consists of characteristics of the individual himself, such as age, health, income, etc. The second type of variables consists of the characteristics of the individuals...

We propose the river pollution claims problem to distribute a limited pollution budget among agents located along a river. A key distinction with the standard claims problem is that agents are ordered and they are given priority based on their location in this order instead of their identity. We...

Public benefit-cost analysis of market policies often relies on a particular definition of market surplus that adds up consumer and producer surplus and external costs. This paper provides an overview of conceptual strategies to deal with moral considerations and then develops an adjusted market...

We propose the river pollution claims problem to distribute a pollution budget among agents located along a river. A key distinction with the standard claims problem is that agents are ordered exogenously. For environmental reasons, the location of pollution along the river is an important...

In this paper I study conditions for the emergence of cooperativebehavior in a dynamic model of population interaction.The model has finitely many individuals located on a circle. The pay-off of each individual is partly based on the (local)interaction with neighbors and partly on (uniform)...

We take a decentralized approach to regulating environmental pollution in settings where each agent's pollution possibly affects all others. There is no central agency to enforce pollution abatement or coordinate monetary transfers. Moreover, agents possess private information, which precludes...