Showing 1 - 10 of 336
are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to … network. (2) Average inclination governs collective adoption behavior. (3) Initial inclinations determine the critical mass of … network and other parameters. Given the complexity of the system we use a standard technique for estimating the solution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061677
that the individual's incentives depend on the architecture of the network as well as on the position of the individual … within the network. In particular, when an efficient interaction requires players to mutually cooperate, efficient social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325280
network. Interestingly, unconnected equilibria are asymmetric and central players may emerge. Second, I show that non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325361
paper continues on the work of Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst (2003). In their paper they investigate a model of network …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325385
-making experiment preceding the take game. The gameconsists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides howmuch income …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324423
are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to … network. (2) Average inclination governs collective adoption behavior. (3) Initial inclinations determine the critical mass of … network and other parameters. Given the complexity of the system we use a standard technique for estimating the solution. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328348
price discussions is the only way for subjects to avoid the one-shot competitive equilibrium. Subjects in the experiment of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325765
We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to testvarious models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and rationalbehavior. Our results are inconsistent with leading models in this field.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324979
threat of terminating them from the team (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). We extend a standard weakest link experiment with a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288411
dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325527