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We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040150
We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326342
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491315
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047081
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ⌊|N |/2⌋-core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038137
allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost … consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a non-empty core for any vector of revenues if, and only … if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040091
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325691
-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325870
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325973
allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost … consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a non-empty core for any vector of revenues if, and only … if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326323