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Halal Certification for Financial Products : A Transaction Cost Perspective
Hayat, Raphie - 2011
Halal certification of financials product may reduce transaction costs for its buyers when it provides a trusted standard for investors that seek to comply with Islamic law. However, we show that in practice it takes considerable amounts of time (20 days) and money (USD 122,000) to obtain a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117973
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Signaling Quality through Prices in an Oligopoly
Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Roy, Santanu - 2007
Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325591
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Halal Certification for Financial Products: A Transaction Cost Perspective
Hayat, Raphie; den Butter, Frank A.G.; Kock, Udo - 2011
Halal certification of financials product may reduce transaction costs for its buyers when it provides a trusted standard for investors that seek to comply with Islamic law. However, we show that in practice it takes considerable amounts of time (20 days ) and money (USD 122,000) to obtain a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326346
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Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - 2011
-value goods (lemons). We investigate the consequences of this inverse adverse selection and its potential solutions. The … uninformed buyer in a traditional market for lemons experiences the quality of the good he purchased; instead, the uninformed … the lemons problem often ineffective in the gems case. We further explore the theoretical and practical appeal of m arket …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325638
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Monitoring your Friends, not your Foes: Strategic Ignorance and the Delegation of Real Authority
Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Sloof, Randolph; von … - 2010
In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to better exploit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325914
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Price-setting Power versus Private Information
Sloof, Randolph - 2003
This paper investigates the extent of the holdup underinvestment problem in a buyer-seller relationship in which the seller has private information about his alternative trading opportunities. Theory predicts that, compared with a situation in which outside options are publicly observed, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325012
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Does price competition damage healthcare quality?
Roos, Anne-Fleur; van Doorslaer, Eddy; O'Donnell, Owen; … - 2018
One of the reasons why regulators are hesitant about permitting price competition in healthcare markets is that it may damage quality when information is poor. Evidence on whether this fear is well-founded is scarce. We provide evidence using a reform that permitted Dutch health insurers and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932311
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Cycles and Multiple Equilibria in the Market for Durable Lemons
Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir - 2000
We investigate the nature of market failure in a dynamic version ofAkerlof (1970) where identicalcohorts of a durable good enter the market over time. In the dynamicmodel, equilibria withqualitatively different properties emerge. Typically, in equilibriaof the dynamic model, sellerswith higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324453
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Continuous Time Trading in Markets with Adverse Selection
Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir - 2000
We investigate the nature of the adverse selection problem in a market for adurable goodwhere trading and entry of new buyers and sellers takes place in continuoustime. In thecontinuous time model equilibria with properties that are qualitativelydifferent from thestatic equilibria, emerge....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324471
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Dynamic Insurance and Adverse Selection
Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - 2001
We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand Stiglitz model where agents may differ with respect to theaccidental probability and their expenditure levels incase an accident occurs. We investigate the nature of dynamicinsurance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324841