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Subjective Expectations of Medical Expenditures and Insurance in Rural Ethiopia
Yilma, Zelalem; O'Donnell, Owen; Mebratie, Anagaw; … - 2015
Little is known about perceptions of medical expenditure risks despite their presumed relevance to health insurance demand. This paper reports on a unique elicitation of subjective probabilities of medical expenditures from rural Ethiopians who are offered the opportunity to purchase health...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011403583
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Herding, Information Cascades and Volatility Spillovers in Futures Markets
McAleer, Michael; Radalj, Kim - 2013
Economists and financial analysts have begun to recognise the importance of the actions of other agents in the decision-making process. Herding is the deliberate mimicking of the decisions of other agents. Examples of mimicry range from the choice of restaurant, fashion and financial market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326188
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Subjective Expectations of Medical Expenditures and Insurance in Rural Ethiopia
Yilma, Zelalem; O'Donnell, Owen; Mebratie, Anagaw; … - 2015
Little is known about perceptions of medical expenditure risks despite their presumed relevance to health insurance demand. This paper reports on a unique elicitation of subjective probabilities of medical expenditures from rural Ethiopians who are offered the opportunity to purchase health...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014132288
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Diffusion of Behavior in Network Games Orchestrated by Social Learning
Huang, Jia-Ping; Koster, Maurice; Lindner, Ines - 2013
-benefit parameter. There are four main insights of our model: (1) A variety of collective adoption behaviors is determined by the … network. (2) Average inclination governs collective adoption behavior. (3) Initial inclinations determine the critical mass of … adoption which ensures the new behavior to prevail. (4) Equilibria and dynamic be- havior changes as we change the underlying …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328348
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Diffusion of Behavior in Network Games Orchestrated by Social Learning
Huang, Jia-Ping - 2014
-benefit parameter. There are four main insights of our model: (1) A variety of collective adoption behaviors is determined by the … network. (2) Average inclination governs collective adoption behavior. (3) Initial inclinations determine the critical mass of … adoption which ensures the new behavior to prevail. (4) Equilibria and dynamic behavior changes as we change the underlying …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061677
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Catching Hipo's: Screening, Wages and Unemployment
Janssen, Maarten C.W. - 2000
In this paper, I study the wage a firm sets to attract high abilityworkers (hipo's) in situationsof unemployment. I show that the higher unemployment, the larger afirm's incentives to sorthigh and low ability workers. Moreover, workers will signal their(high) ability in situationsof (high)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324718
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Information Overload in Monopsony Markets
Ficco, Stefano - 2004
I consider a situation in which heterogenous senders (applicants) compete in order to be selected by one receiver (employer). Productivity is private information to the senders, and the receiver processes imperfect signals (applications) to screen among applicants. The information-processing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325434
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Terrorist Targeting, Information, and Secret Coalitions
Koster, Maurice; Lindner, Ines; McCormick, Gordon; … - 2010
We consider a game played by a state sponsor of terrorism, a terrorist group, and the target of terrorist attacks. The sponsoring state wishes to see as much damage inflicted on the target of attack as possible, but wishes to avoid retaliation. To do so, his relationship with the terrorist group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325672
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Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011
We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325901
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Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325937