Showing 1 - 10 of 230
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325638
. Repeated interactions make it possible to threaten workers with exclusion from future insurance benefits after a default on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012606018
screening mechanism then be applied to deter those most likely to default from seeking such financial assistance? The answer … information and a screening contract. The sector adversely affected in a pandemic can apply for government loans to reopen later …. A pro-allocation government sets a harsh default sanction to deter entrepreneurs with bad projects thereby improving …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427144
The Basel Committee proposed the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) to curb excessive maturity mismatch of the banking sector. However, it remains to be ascertained as to what are the financial and real effects of the NSFR on banks' credit quality, investment, and the pass-through of monetary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427164
Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325647
risk by overrating the agent's performance. Second, I show that by screening for one supervisor type, firms can incentivize … the supervisor to truthfully report performance at the lowest possible costs. For this reason, screening may be optimal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328332
This paper investigates the optimal design of incentives when agents distort probabilities. We show that the type of probability distortion displayed by the agent and its degree determine whether an incentivecompatible contract can be implemented, the strength of the incentives included in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321765
In this paper, I study the wage a firm sets to attract high abilityworkers (hipo's) in situationsof unemployment. I show that the higher unemployment, the larger afirm's incentives to sorthigh and low ability workers. Moreover, workers will signal their(high) ability in situationsof (high)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324718
We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand Stiglitz model where agents may differ with respect to theaccidental probability and their expenditure levels incase an accident occurs. We investigate the nature of dynamicinsurance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324841
This paper uses micro data from four OECD countries (the United States, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands), to assess the determinants of household debt holding and to investigate whether or not credit constraints are important for household debt holding. We extend the existing literature in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325196