An experiment is conducted were subjects interact repeatedly to examine the effect of a particular leniency program on …

, destabilizes cartels, reduces the probability that a cartel re-establishes, and reduces theaverage winning bid. In contrast, while … a leniency program has no additional effect on cartelformation or cartel recidivism, it makes cartels more stable and …

to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe … information is present, suggesting that firms have greater incentives to form cartels in that situation. …

An experiment is conducted were subjects interact repeatedly to examine the effect of a particular leniency program on …

overt collusion, stable cartels buy at a lower price in EN than in FPSB resulting in a lower average winning bid in EN …

to screen industries that traditionally apply delivered pricing for the presence of cartels. We operationalize this … screen with a software. The test is hard to beat for cartels using this otherwise elusive form of price-fixing. When a cartel …

cartels, including revenue-based penalties, the most widely used regime. We showed that for a typical industry overcharge …

price discussions is the only way for subjects to avoid the one-shot competitive equilibrium. Subjects in the experiment of …