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The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2009
collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how likely cartels persist after each conviction. Our analysis …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326004
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The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2014
We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are linked to illegal gains and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. A novel aspect of this study is that we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491373
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The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2009
collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how likely cartels persist after each conviction. Our analysis …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014203713
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The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements
Hinloopen, Jeroen - 2005
payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325316
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Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2008
For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325912
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Collusive Benchmark Rates Fixing
Boot, Nuria; Klein, Timo; Schinkel, Maarten-Pieter - 2017
The fixing of the Libor and Euribor benchmark rates has proven vulnerable to manipulation. Individual rate-setters may have incentives to fraudulently distort their submissions. For the contributing banks to collectively agree on the direction in which to rig the rate, however, their interests...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819515
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The Pro-Collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements
Hinloopen, Jeroen - 2006
payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061187
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Firm-Specific Information and Explicit Collusion in Experimental Oligopolies
Gomez-Martin, Francisco; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2015
to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe … information is present, suggesting that firms have greater incentives to form cartels in that situation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288400
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Trust and Recidivism; the Partial Success of Corporate Leniency Program in the Laboratory
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Soetevent, Adriaan - 2006
An experiment is conducted were subjects interact repeatedly to examine the effect of a particular leniency program on cartel formation, cartel stability and cartel recidivism. The program leads to lower prices for three reasons. First, non-cooperators are more persistent in their behavior which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325279
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Tracing the Base: A Topographic Test for Collusive Basing-Point Pricing
Bos, Iwan; Schinkel, Maarten Pieter - 2009
to screen industries that traditionally apply delivered pricing for the presence of cartels. We operationalize this … screen with a software. The test is hard to beat for cartels using this otherwise elusive form of price-fixing. When a cartel …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326071