to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized … information is available and participants cannot communicate. In contrast, when communication is possible, results reverse …: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe …

cartels, including revenue-based penalties, the most widely used regime. We showed that for a typical industry overcharge …

between competitive and collusive basing-point pricing. We define a measure for the likelihood of collusion that can be used … to screen industries that traditionally apply delivered pricing for the presence of cartels. We operationalize this … screen with a software. The test is hard to beat for cartels using this otherwise elusive form of price-fixing. When a cartel …

This paper develops a model of the birth and death of cartels in the presence of enforcement activities by a … Competition Authority (CA). We distinguish three sets of interventions: (a) detecting, prosecuting and penalizing cartels; (b … to prevent the re-emergence of prosecuted cartels in the longer term. The last two intervention activities have not been …

potential for product market collusion. For that we utilize a dynamic model of R&D whereby we consider all possible initial … extension of the cooperative agreement towards collusion in the product market is not necessarily welfare reducing: if firms …

We develop a method to screen for local cartels. We first test whether there is statistical evidence of clustering of …

competition policy, where cartels may be exempted on CSR grounds. …