coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the nucleolus. A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a … provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of the restricted games corresponding to a class of games with …

distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the nucleolus. A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a … computing the nucleolus of every restricted game corresponding to some disjunctive non-negative additive game with an acyclic …

ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it lies in … the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We prove … that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core.We conclude by some examples showing the usefulness of the …

This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen … that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for … associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any zero-normalized balanced game, the 1-nucleolus coincides with the Aumann …

individual compensations, and one about case-system consistency. This unique compensation scheme is the nucleolus of an …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …

allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost … consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a non-empty core for any vector of revenues if, and only … if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games …