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In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a behavioral refinement and stability measure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014185948
how power shapes clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184653
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325937
experiment, while coordination failures emerge in the following periods sweeping away the beneficial effect of communication at … others creating socially suboptimal outcomes. We investigate if and how communication mitigates the strategic delay in … introducing communication into this setting reduces strategic delay. We implement our model in a laboratory experiment utilizing a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013427592
We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information … by an experiment. Finally, we show how partial information transmission can lead to communication failure, and show how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325901
We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2011b). ACDC has been shown to be predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326221
how communication mitigates this free-riding problem in an investment-timing game. In our baseline investment-timing game …. If more investors invest at the same time, they share the costs. In the communication treatment, subjects can freely … communicate before choosing the investment time. We find that in groups of two players, communication increases cooperation and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321806
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491401
We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2012a). ACDC has been shown to be predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113620
In many real-life situations people face a simple decision whether to volunteer or not to provide some benefit for themselves and also for others. This research investigates the effects of the group size and the magnitude of the volunteering cost in a controlled large-scale laboratory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932343