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satiable agents, i.e., the benefit function is decreasing beyond some satiation point. In such situations externalities appear … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In ca! se … of satiation points, it appears that every weighted hierarchical solution is independent of the externalities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014191059
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are … complete communication structure, then the proposed solution coincides with the Shapley value, and that if the game has a cycle …-free communication structure, it is the solution proposed by Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008). We introduce the notion of link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723255
In this paper we introduce an extension of the model of restricted communication in cooperative games as introduced in … Myerson (1977) by allowing communication links to be directed and the worth of a coalition to depend on the order in which the … players enter the coalition. Therefore, we model the communication network by a directed graph and the cooperative game by a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047887
We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by … communication graph the total payoff to the players of this component in the game itself to the total payoff of these players when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043850
how power shapes clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184653
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are … complete communication structure, then the proposed solution coincides with the Shapley value, and that if the game has a cycle …-free communication structure, it is the solution proposed by Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008). We introduce the notion of link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325870
which they usually take different positions. Two examples of such structures are communication networks and hierarchies. In … feasible sets in communication networks and compare them with feasible sets arising from hierarchies. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325156
Cooperative games on antimatroids are cooperative games restricted by a combinatorial structure which generalize the permission structure. So, cooperative games on antimatroids group several well-known families of games which have important applications in economics and politics. Therefore, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324827
We model a firm in an institutional market setting, consisting of a production technology and its governance. The governance consists of a hierarchical firm structure, a cost efficiency parameter,and an internal pay system. The depth of the firm is determined by profit maximization under the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325411
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure. In such games the player set is partitioned into unions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326205