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Power and the Privilege of Clarity : An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, T. J. S.; Onderstal, Sander - 2012
People in inferior bargaining positions are often vaguer when they express their preferences. In this paper, we explain how power shapes clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Our main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184653
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Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011
We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325901
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Diffusion of Behavior in Network Games Orchestrated by Social Learning
Huang, Jia-Ping - 2014
are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to … network. (2) Average inclination governs collective adoption behavior. (3) Initial inclinations determine the critical mass of … network and other parameters. Given the complexity of the system we use a standard technique for estimating the solution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061677
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A Simple Model of Self-Assessments
Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - 2006
We develop a simple model that describes individuals’ self-assessments oftheir abilities. We assume that individuals learn about their abilities from appraisalsof others and experience. Our model predicts that if communicationis imperfect, then (i) appraisals of others tend to be too positive,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325242
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The Self-Perception Theory vs. a Dynamic Learning Model
Swank, Otto H. - 2006
Several economists have directed our attention to a finding in the social psychological literature that extrinsic motivation may undermine intrinsic motivation. The self-perception (SP) theory developed by Bem (1972) explains this finding. The crux of this theory is that people remember their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325504
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Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation
Wrasai, Phongthorn; Swank, Otto H. - 2004
When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325563
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On the Role of Pre-Determined Rules for HRM Policies
Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - 2011
Using simple game-theoretical models, this paper studies the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. We consider a model in which HRM decisions affect employees' self-images and thereby their motivation. We show that in the absence of written rules, managers are too reluctant (1) to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325637
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Why Are Residents Reluctant to Consult Attending Physicians?
Swank, Otto H. - 2009
A physician performs two tasks: making diagnoses and determining treatments. To reduce medical error, residents are supposed to consult their supervisors when they face uncommon circumstances. However, recent research shows that residents are reluctant to do so. This paper presents a model that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325698
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Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325937
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An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011
We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2011b). ACDC has been shown to be predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326221