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Capacity Choice of Dams under Rivalry Use and Externalities
Houba, Harold; Do, Kim Hang Pham; Zhu, Xueqin - 2014
This paper studies the relation between optimal dam capacity and water management under rivalry uses and externalities …-linear building cost of dam capacity and externalities in a welfare optimization model. We obtain the optimal dam capacity for multi …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491378
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Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
van den Brink, René; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2010
satiable agents, i.e., the benefit function is decreasing beyond some satiation point. In such situations externalities appear … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In ca! se … of satiation points, it appears that every weighted hierarchical solution is independent of the externalities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014191059
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Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences
Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan - 2006
There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation model when players have different time preferences. We show that players behave quite differently under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027199
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Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2010
satiable agents, i.e., the benefit function is decreasing beyond some satiation point. In such situations externalities appear … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of … satiation points, it appears that every weighted hierarchical solution is independent of the externalities. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325973
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Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining
Houba, Harold - 2005
The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325478
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Alternating Offers in Economic Environments
Houba, Harold - 2005
The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for positive time between proposals. As time vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325509
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Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model
Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan - 2007
We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set of its subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, we provide a recursive technique that relies on the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payoffs. When players have different time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325535
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Preopening and Equilibrium Selection
Calcagno, Riccardo; Lovo, Stefano - 2010
We introduce a form of pre-play communication that we call preopening. During the preopening, players announce their tentative actions to be played in the underlying game. Announcements are made using a posting system which is subject to stochastic failures. Posted actions are publicly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326012
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Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure
van den Brink, René - 2011
this game the dividend of any coalition that is neither a subset of a union nor a union of unions is zero. The partition … dividend of any coalition that is not connected in the graph is zero. We apply the values to an economic example in which the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118315
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Terrorist Targeting, Information, and Secret Coalitions
Koster, Maurice; Lindner, Ines; McCormick, Gordon C.; … - 2010
We consider a game played by a state sponsor of terrorism, a terrorist group, and the target of terrorist attacks. The sponsoring state wishes to see as much damage inflicted on the target of attack as possible, but wishes to avoid retaliation. To do so, his relationship with the terrorist group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045844