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Power and the Privilege of Clarity : An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012

People in inferior bargaining positions are often vaguer when they express their preferences. In this paper, we explain how power shapes clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Our main...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184653

Why Are Open Ascending Auctions Popular? The Role of Information Aggregation and Behavioral Biases

Offerman, Theo; Romagnoli, Giorgia; Ziegler, Andreas - 2020

aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they … and in the potential activation of behavioral biases: (i) the ascending Vickrey auction, a closed format; and two open … formats, (ii) the Japanese-English auction and (iii) the Oral Outcry auction. Even though bidders react to information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014352203

Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - 2011

This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325638

Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission

de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325901

Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games : ACDC Rocks When Other Criteria Remain Silent

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012

In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a behavioral refinement and stability measure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014185948

Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent

de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011

Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325937

Auctioning Incentive Contracts : An Experimental Study

Onderstal, Sander; Meerendonk, Arthur van de - 2010

-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200953

Collusion and the Choice of Auction : An Experimental Study

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - 2010

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction is repeated and bidders are patient enough. We find that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014188545

Mergers in Bidding Markets

Janssen, Maarten; Karamychev, Vladimir - 2013

We analyze the effects of mergers in first-price sealed-bid auctions on bidders' equilibrium bidding functions and on revenue. We also study the incentives of bidders to merge given the private information they have. We develop two models, depending on how after-merger valuations are created. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326240

Money Talks? An Experimental Investigation of Cheap Talk and Burned Money

Haan, Thomas de; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - 2011

We experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used for communication purposes. Theoretically a large number of equilibria exist side by side, in which senders either use costless messages, money, or a combination of the two....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183255