Consider a government that auctions a franchise for, e.g., an airport, telecommunication network, or utility. Consider an 'incumbent bidder' that owns a complement or substitute. With an auction on the transfer (i.e. payment) to the government, the incumbent is advantaged.If the government...

We analyse congestion pricing in a road and rail network with heterogeneous users. On the road there is bottleneck congestion. In the train there is crowding congestion. We separately analyse "proportional heterogeneity" that varies the values of time and schedule delay scalarly in fixed...

Consider a government tendering the right to operate, for example, an airport, telecommunication network, or utility. There is an 'incumbent bidder' who owns a complement or substitute facility, and one entering 'new bidder'. With a 'standard auction' on the payment to the government, the...

This paper resulted in a publication in <A HREF="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191261514000939"><I>Transportation Research Part B: Methodological</I></A>, 2014, 67, 320-343.<P> This paper studies whether a regulator needs to correct the route structure choice by carriers with market power in the presence of congestion externalities, in addition to correct their...</p></i></a>