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Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision
Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin G. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255473
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Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision
Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin G. - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144512
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Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered
Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137046
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Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered
Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256730
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Does Stake Size matter for Cooperation and Punishment?
Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257415
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The Impact of Naïve Advice and Observational Learning in Beauty-contest Games
Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias; Wakolbinger, Florian - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007
We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255507
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The Impact of Naïve Advice and Observational Learning in Beauty-contest Games
Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias; Wakolbinger, Florian - Tinbergen Institute - 2007
We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144513