This paper conducts the first general equilibrium analysis of the role of entry, exit and profits in industry dynamics. The benefit of our model is twofold. First, to discriminate between entrants’ role of performing the entrepreneurial function of creating disequilibrium and the conventional...

This paper conducts the first general equilibrium analysis of the role of entry, exit and profits in industry dynamics. The benefit of our model is twofold. First, to discriminate between entrants’ role of performing the entrepreneurial function of creating disequilibrium and the conventional...

Human capital obtained through education has been shown to be one of the strongest drivers of entrepreneurship performance. The entrepreneur's human capital is, though, only one of the input factors into the production process of her venture. The value of other input factors, such as (knowledge)...

Policy in developed countries is often based on the assumption that higher business ownership rates induce economic value. Recent microeconomic empirical evidence casts doubts on the validity of this assumption or, at least, leads to a more nuanced view: Especially the top performing business...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <A href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11187-012-9436-x">'Small Business Economics'</A>, 2013, 41(2), 335-357.<P> Policy in developed countries is often based on the assumption that higher business ownership rates induce economic value. Recent microeconomic empirical evidence casts doubts on the validity of...</p></a>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'Journal of Business Venturing', 2014, 29(5), pages 612-632.<P> Human capital obtained through education has been shown to be one of the strongest drivers of entrepreneurship performance. The entrepreneur's human capital is, though, only one of...</p>

We study the effect of going-concern contingent capital on bank risk choice. The possibility of debt for equity conversion forces deleveraging in highly levered states, when risk incentives are worse. The additional equity reduces endogenous risk shifting by diluting returns in high states. An...

Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...