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Credit Rationing Effects of Credit Value-at-Risk
Slijkerman, Jan Frederik; Smant, David J.C.; Vries, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to … asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136889
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Credit Rationing Effects of Credit Value-at-Risk
Slijkerman, Jan Frederik; Smant, David J.C.; Vries, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to … asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257219
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Will Islamic Banking make the World less risky? An Empirical Analysis of Capital Structure, Risk Shifting and Financial Stability
Farooq, Moazzam; Wijnbergen, Sweder van; Zaheer, Sajjad - Tinbergen Instituut - 2015
-fledged Islamic banks (IBs) are indeed more stable than conventional banking institutions (CBIs), and are better capitalized than … loss provisioning. Similar results obtain for Islamic windows of mixed banks compared with conventional windows. The … analysis suggests that the loss absorption capacity of Islamic banks leads to less risk taking and a more stable banking system. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272595
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Will Islamic Banking make the World less risky? An Empirical Analysis of Capital Structure, Risk Shifting and Financial Stability
Farooq, Moazzam; Wijnbergen, Sweder van; Zaheer, Sajjad - Tinbergen Instituut - 2015
-fledged Islamic banks (IBs) are indeed more stable than conventional banking institutions (CBIs), and are better capitalized than … loss provisioning. Similar results obtain for Islamic windows of mixed banks compared with conventional windows. The … analysis suggests that the loss absorption capacity of Islamic banks leads to less risk taking and a more stable banking system. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011275100
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State Aid and Bank Intervention: The ING Illiquid Assets Back-up Facility (IABF)
Wijnbergen, Sweder van; Treur, Leontine - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
The ING Illiquid Assets Back-up Facility announced January 2009 was a SWAP-based insurance to reduce ING’s exposure to Alt-A related risk. Did the deal involve state aid? Usingmarketprices to evaluate the SWAP directly is impossible because markets for Alt-A based CDOs had collapsed. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255729
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Cocos, Contagion and Systemic Risk
Chan, Stephanie; Wijnbergen, Sweder van - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
CoCo’s (contingent convertible capital) are designed to convert from debt to equity when banks need it most. Using a … on other banks in the system in the likely case of correlated asset returns, so bank runs elsewhere in the banking system …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255852
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Incentives for Effective Risk Management
Daníelsson, Jón; Jorgensen, Bjørn N.; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Instituut - 2001
Under the new Capital Accord, banks choose between two different types of risk management systems, the standard or the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255855
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The Political Economy of Financial Systems
Haber, Stephen; Perotti, Enrico - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255875
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The Political Economy of Financial Fragility
Feijen, Erik; Perotti, Enrico - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005
While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255930
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Lobbying on Entry
Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256172