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The Political Economy of Financial Fragility
Feijen, Erik; Perotti, Enrico - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005
While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255930
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Lobbying on Entry
Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256172
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The Political Economy of Financial Fragility
Feijen, Erik; Perotti, Enrico - Tinbergen Institute - 2005
While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144400
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Investor Protection and Entry
Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - Tinbergen Institute - 2007
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136893
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Lobbying on Entry
Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequality and political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In- cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potential entrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137200
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A Pigovian Approach to Liquidity Regulation
Perotti, Enrico; Suarez, Javier - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
This paper discusses liquidity regulation when short-term funding enables credit growth but generates negative systemic risk externalities. It focuses on the relative
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008867501
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Bank Ownership and Financial Stability
Perotti, Enrico; Vorage, Marcel - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838581
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A Pigovian Approach to Liquidity Regulation
Perotti, Enrico; Suarez, Javier - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
incentives for risk creation.When banks differ in credit opportunities, a Pigovian tax on short-term funding is efficient in … credit incentives are strongest.When banks differ instead mostly in gambling incentives (due to low charter valueor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256463
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Bank Ownership and Financial Stability
Perotti, Enrico; Vorage, Marcel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010
We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions … maximize their rents. As state banks are less efficient, at higher level of accountability there is a shift to private control …. At the transition point there is a jumpin risk taking, as private banks do not internalize the social costs of bank …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256743
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Investor Protection and Entry
Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256887