Showing 1 - 8 of 8
-fledged Islamic banks (IBs) are indeed more stable than conventional banking institutions (CBIs), and are better capitalized than … loss provisioning. Similar results obtain for Islamic windows of mixed banks compared with conventional windows. The … analysis suggests that the loss absorption capacity of Islamic banks leads to less risk taking and a more stable banking system. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272595
-fledged Islamic banks (IBs) are indeed more stable than conventional banking institutions (CBIs), and are better capitalized than … loss provisioning. Similar results obtain for Islamic windows of mixed banks compared with conventional windows. The … analysis suggests that the loss absorption capacity of Islamic banks leads to less risk taking and a more stable banking system. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011275100
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136893
This paper discusses liquidity regulation when short-term funding enables credit growth but generates negative systemic risk externalities. It focuses on the relative
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008867501
We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838581
incentives for risk creation.When banks differ in credit opportunities, a Pigovian tax on short-term funding is efficient in … credit incentives are strongest.When banks differ instead mostly in gambling incentives (due to low charter valueor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256463
We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions … maximize their rents. As state banks are less efficient, at higher level of accountability there is a shift to private control …. At the transition point there is a jumpin risk taking, as private banks do not internalize the social costs of bank …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256743
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256887