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Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136893

Bank Ownership and Financial Stability

Perotti, Enrico; Vorage, Marcel - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838581

Insecure Debt

Perotti, Enrico; Matta, Rafael - Tinbergen Instituut - 2015

Does demand for safety create instability ? Secured (repo) funding can be made so safe that it never runs, but shifts risk to unsecured creditors. We show that this triggers more frequent runs by unsecured creditors, even in the absence of fundamental risk. This effect is separate from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256299

Bank Ownership and Financial Stability

Perotti, Enrico; Vorage, Marcel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010

We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions … maximize their rents. As state banks are less efficient, at higher level of accountability there is a shift to private control …. At the transition point there is a jumpin risk taking, as private banks do not internalize the social costs of bank …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256743

Investor Protection and Entry

Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256887