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The Political Economy of Financial Systems
Haber, Stephen; Perotti, Enrico - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255875
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The Political Economy of Finance
Perotti, Enrico - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
This survey reviews how a recent political economy literature helps explaining variation in governance, competition, funding composition and access to credit. Evolution in political institutions can account for financial evolution, and appear critical to explain rapid changes in financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256233
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Investor Protection and Entry
Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - Tinbergen Institute - 2007
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136893
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The Political Economy of Financial Systems
Haber, Stephen; Perotti, Enrico - Tinbergen Institute - 2008
This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms. The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137221
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Bank Ownership and Financial Stability
Perotti, Enrico; Vorage, Marcel - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838581
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Bank Ownership and Financial Stability
Perotti, Enrico; Vorage, Marcel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010
We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions … maximize their rents. As state banks are less efficient, at higher level of accountability there is a shift to private control …. At the transition point there is a jumpin risk taking, as private banks do not internalize the social costs of bank …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256743
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Investor Protection and Entry
Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007
Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256887