properness and a robust Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the …

Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a …

cooperative game with transferable utility. A solution for TU-games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of the payoffs that … can be earned over the individual players. Two well-known solutions for TU-games are the Shapley value and the egalitarian … earns zero worth. We illustrate this difference between these two solutions by applying them to auction games. …

by cooperation. A solution mapping for these games is amapping which assigns to every game a set of payoff …

We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with a limited communication structure in which … neutrality for cycle-free graph games yields other solutions such as the hierarchical outcomes and the average tree solution …. Since these solutions also satisfy the superfluous player property, this also `solves' an impossibility for TU-games since …

allocation problems, such as river games, queueing games and auction games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are … 'games with ordered players' which is based on the distribution of 'dividends' taking into account the hierarchical ordering … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well …

efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a …

attention to th e class of cycle-free accessible union stable systems. We also consider cooperative games with restricted … extension of the Shapley value to this class of games. …