Showing 1 - 10 of 229
Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have recently been used around the world to allocate spectrum for mobile telecom licenses. CCAs are claimed to significantly reduce the scope for gaming or strategic bidding. This paper shows, however, that CCAs facilitate strategic bidding. Real bidders in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257342
We analyze sequential Dutch and Vickrey auctions where risk averse, or risk preferring, bidders may have heterogeneous risk exposures. We derive and characterize a pure strategy equilibrium of both auctions for arbitrary number of identical objects. A sufficient, and to certain extent necessary,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256734
We analyze the effects of mergers in first-price sealed-bid auctions on bidders' equilibrium bidding functions and on revenue. We also study the incentives of bidders to merge given the private information they have. We develop two models, depending on how after-merger valuations are created. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256791
This paper develops one possible argument why auctioning licenses to op- erate in an aftermarket may lead to higher prices in the aftermarket compared to a more random allocation mechanism. Key ingredients in the argument are differences in firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137048
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838639
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256127
This paper develops one possible argument why auctioning licenses to op-erate in an aftermarket may lead to higher prices in the aftermarket comparedto a more random allocation mechanism. Key ingredients in the argumentare differences in firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256307
Many networks such as the Internet have been found to possess scale-free and small-world network properties reflected by so-called power law distributions. Scale-free properties evolve in large complex networks through self-organizing processes and more specifically, preferential attachment. New...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257070
Network shares and retail prices are not symmetric in the telecommunications market with multiple bottlenecks which give rise to new questions of access fee regulation. In this paper we consider a model with two types of asymmetry arising from different entry timing, i.e. a larger reputation for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136930
Many networks such as the Internet have been found to possess scale-free and small-world network properties reflected by so-called power law distributions. Scale-free properties evolve in large complex networks through self-organizing processes and more specifically, preferential attachment. New...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137060