Showing 1 - 10 of 64
-out if individuals differ in their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not being controlled …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009201127
sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255507
This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255790
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <A href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00199-008-0338-8">'Economic Theory'</A>, 2009, 39(3), 355-376. Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we deal with the question whether and when static conceptslike evolutionary stability can shed any light on what happens in the dynamical context of a...</a>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256428
This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Social Choice and Welfare', 2005, 24, 439-454.<P> Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterativemethods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed inthe...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256523
This paper is an effort to convince the reader that using a stochastic stage game in a repeated setting - rather than a deterministic one - comes with many advantages. The first is that as a game it is more realistic to assume that payoffs in future games are uncertain. The second is that it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256557
-out if individuals differin their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not beingcontrolled …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256604
In this paper we study international river pollution problems. We introduce a model in which the agents (countries) located along a river derive benefit while causing pollution, but also incur environmental costs of experiencing pollution from all upstream agents. We find that total pollution in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256658
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <I>Strategic Behavior and the Environment</I>, 2014, 4, 321-360.<P> We study multiple agents along a general river structure that is expressed by a geography matrix and who have access to limited local resources, quasi-linear preferences over water and...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256978
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Games and Economic Behavior', 2007, 59, 85-104. <P> We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257354