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Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure
Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
This discussion paper led to a publication in 'TOP' (forthcoming).<P> In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game....</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255446
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Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations
Brink, René van den; Gilles, Robert P. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003
In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decisionmakers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255955
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The Prediction Value
Koster, Maurice; Kurz, Sascha; Lindner, Ines; Napel, Stefan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players’ informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i’s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256041
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Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations
Brink, René van den; Gilles, Robert P. - Tinbergen Institute - 2003
In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decision makers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144514
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The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008
-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255465
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New Characterizations for Largeness of the Core
Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
-180. In this paper we provide three new characterizations of largeness of the core. The first characterization of largeness of … the core is based on minimal covers of the grand coalition and associated inequalities. The second characterization shows … the relation between the bases that provide core elements of the game and the bases that provide core elements of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256231
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The Restricted Core for Totally Positive Games with Ordered Players
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasil'ev, Valeri - Tinbergen Institute
nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well … coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016260
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On Harsanyi Payoff Vectors and the Weber Set
Derks, Jean; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasil'ev, Valeri - Tinbergen Institute - 2002
, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136982
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The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - Tinbergen Institute - 2008
-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137089
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Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008646228