Showing 1 - 10 of 259
-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects … important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where …, tournaments, R&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964456
-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects … important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where …, tournaments, R&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests.<p>This paper has been accepted by <A href …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257530
We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255473
This study documents two empirical regularities, using data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the first to leave the firm (Last In, First Out; LIFO). Second, workers’ wages rise with seniority (= a worker’s tenure relative to the tenure of her colleagues). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255817
In this paper we investigate trade union formation. To this end we apply a model with two types of labour where both groups decide on whether they prefer to be represented by either two independent craft-specific (professional) labour unions or by a joint (encompassing) labour union. Applying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256112
We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144512
This study documents two empirical regularities, using data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the first to leave the firm (Last In, First Out; LIFO). Second, workers’ wages rise with seniority (= a worker’s tenure relative to the tenure of her colleagues). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137057
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256127
This paper develops one possible argument why auctioning licenses to op- erate in an aftermarket may lead to higher prices in the aftermarket compared to a more random allocation mechanism. Key ingredients in the argument are differences in firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137048
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838639