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efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256656
specific attention to the efficiency, sustainability, and fairness of solutions to this model. We compare and contrast both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257048
use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion … these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency …, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964462
efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called component balancedness. This latter axiom compares for every component in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008867500
various axiomatizations of these solutions can be found. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value often use efficiency which is … the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality … and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and linearity if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256444
Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257219
This discussion paper led to a publication in the <I>Journal of Risk and Insurance</I>. Vol. 72(1), pages 45-59.<P> We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand Stiglitz model where agents may differ with respect to theaccidental...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257433
Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136889
I present a model in which individuals compete for a prize by choosing to apply or not. Abilities are private information and in attempt to select the best candidate, the committee compares applicants with an imperfect technology. The choice of application cost, size of the prize and use of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136926
We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverse selection and study a generalized Rothschild and Stiglitz model where agents may differ with respect to the accidental probability and their expenditure levels in case an accident occurs. We investigate the nature of dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136996